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ARGUMENT 
L A TRANSCRIPT OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING BELOW IS 
UNNECESSARY 
Appellee first urges the Court to dismiss this appeal because Appellants did not 
include a copy of the transcript of the summary judgment hearing in the appellate record. 
This claim, however, ignores the Court's standard for review - i.e. de novo - and evinces 
a misreading of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(e). 
It is undisputed that the standard for review of this appeal is de novo which simply 
means that this Court will accord no deference to the trial court's award of summary 
judgment: "Because a challenge to summary judgment presents for review only questions 
of law, we accord no particular deference to the district court's conclusions but 
review them for correctness." Walker Drug Co.. Inc. v La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 
1231 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Furthermore, findings of fact (if 
any exist from the summary judgment proceeding below) are irrelevant for purposes of 
this appeal. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am.. 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1991) (holding that, 
"a challenge to a summary judgment presents for review only conclusions of law because, 
by definition, cases decided on summary judgment do not resolve factual disputes") 
(citations omitted). By virtue of this standard of review, then, a transcript of the summary 
judgment hearing - despite the complete absence of any testimony or new evidence 
5 
presented at said hearing1 - is unnecessary for this appeal. 
Appellee claims that a "critical part" of the hearing transcript is necessary for 
this Court's review. Appellee identifies this missing "critical part" of the transcript as 
being the "specific grounds" upon which the trial court relied in granting Appellee 
summary judgment, I J.R .C.P 52(a), however, disposses of Appellee's "specific grounds" 
claim: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon.... Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . . The trial court need not 
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on motions, except 
as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one 
ground. 
(Emphasis added). Thus, if Appellee's Motion for Summai y Judgment w as not "based on 
more than one ground," the specific grounds for granting the motion need not be included 
in the order. Such is the case at bar. In Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, he 
moved the trial court to dismiss each of Appellants' four causes of action because they 
each failed to state a claim upon wh ich relief could be granted (i e. > Appellants could not 
1
 Absolutely no testimony was taken at the summary judgment hearing (and Appellee has 
never claimed otherwise). The hearing only consisted of argument off of the briefs. 
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make a prima facie case for each of the four causes of action asserted against Appellee).2 
Thus, the only ground upon which the trial court could have awarded Appellee summary 
judgment is for failure to state a claim. Appellee did not assert any alternative grounds 
for summary judgment. When the trial court, then, granted summary judgment, it 
impliedly granted summary judgment only on Appellee's claim that Appellants did not 
make a prima facie case on each of its four causes of action against Appellee. 
This Court has previously addressed U.R.C.P. 52(a) in this context in Allen v. 
Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992) where it 
explained that, "We recently added the final sentence to rule 52(a) to aid our review of 
summary judgments in which the parties have advanced a number of alternate 
grounds; otherwise, we could not identify the basis for a trial judge's ruling." (Emphasis 
added). 
Similarly, in Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 840 (Utah 1990), the 
Court held that, "In the case of motions to dismiss based on multiple grounds, Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), as of January 1,1987, requires the trial court to issue a 
brief written statement of the grounds upon which such motions are granted." (Emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding U.R.C.P. 52(a), Allen and Hansen, this Court has been faced with 
2
 For the Court's convenience, attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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circumstances similar to the case at bar and held the absence of specific grounds on a 
summary judgment order to be of little import without unusual circumstances: "a trial 
judge's failure to comply with the last sentence of rule 52(a) alone is not reversible error 
absent unusual circumstances." Allen, supra, 839 P.2d at 800-01 
In sum, the cie novo standard of review and the lack, of any alternative bases fo* b 
award of summary judgment render a transcript of the summary judgment hearing 
irrelevant.3 
3
 In support of his contention regarding the hearing transcript, Appellee relies on Bevan v. 
J.H. Constr. Co., 669 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983). However, Bevan was not an appeal after an award 
of summary judgment. Instead, it was an appeal after a trial awarding a money judgment: 
Defendants appeal the money judgment entered against them for breach of contract to 
construct a house. This Court denied plaintiffs' motion to dismiss on procedural grounds, 
but summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the issue of liability because the 
trial transcript was not designated as a part of the record on appeal. In the absence of a 
transcript, we assume that the proceedings at trial were regular and proper and that the 
judgment was supported by competent and sufficient evidence. 
Id. at 443 (emphasis added). Appellee also cited Marbly v. City of SouthfiekL 9 Fed. Appx. 362, 
363-64 (6th Cir. 2001) which, like Bevan, is distinguishable on its facts. In Marbly, the trial court 
referred in two separate orders (one granting a motion to set aside and another granting summary 
judgment) to the hearings corresponding to these motions. 
plaintiff has a duty to order the transcript when it is necessary for review of the issues 
he intends to raise on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b). Here, the district court entered 
orders granting defendants' motion to set aside entries of default and for summary 
judgment, in each case referring to its reasons stated on the record at the pertinent 
hearings which have not been transcribed. Plaintiff failed to fulfil his obligation 
necessary to a determination of the merits of his claims on appeal. Without a transcript, 
this court cannot evaluate the propriety of the challenged district court rulings, and 
plaintiff has waived review of his claims by his failure to provide the transcript. 
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II. APPELLANTS SATISFY THE PRIMA FACIE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THEIR THREE CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST APPELLEE 
Appellee next argues that Appellants cannot make a prima facie showing of their 
three causes of action (negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment and 
negligence). To the contrary, however, Appellants do make prima facie showings of 
these claims. 
A. Negligent Misrepresentation 
Appellee attempts to dispose of Appellants' negligent misrepresentation cause of 
action by claiming it never made a misstatement to Appellants, implying that a 
misstatement is an element of this cause of action. It is not. This cause of action is for 
negligent misrepresentation, not negligent misstatement, A misrepresentation can be 
either words (written or spoken) or conduct. Blacks Law Dictionary 1045 (7th ed. 2000) 
(defining "representation" as a "presentation of fact - either by words or by conduct -
made to induce someone to act,..."). 
It is undisputed that Appellee and Appellee's partner, Patterson Construction, 
represented to Joseph Sharp (of GT Investments) that Lot 223 was suitable for 
(Emphasis added). The hearing transcripts were thus necessary for appellate review. Such 
references in the award of summary judgment in the case at bar, however, are non-existent. 
Marbly is thus inapplicable. 
9 
construction.4 Mr. Sharp testified in an affidavit that, "Patterson Construction and 
[Appellee] never indicated that the lot was anything other than a normal building lot that 
was ready for immediate building." (R 704, f 19) (citing Affidavit of J. Sharp, f 12, 
attached has Exhibit B to Sharp/GTs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment). Mr. Sharp and GT, in turn, made the same representation to Appellants. 
It is undeniable that Appellee and Patterson Construction's whole intent was to 
develop the subdivision at issue for the building of houses. To this extent, Appellants 
relied on the developers (Appellee and Patterson Construction) to develop the lot they 
would buy with a certain amount of reasonable care - especially since Appellee and 
Patterson would be the ones with the greatest knowledge and superior position to 
determine the suitability for building on the land they develop. 
Appellee attempts to distinguish the cases cited in Appellants9 brief in support of 
their negligent misrepresentation cause of action by claiming that "in the cases cited by 
the Smiths, the non-privity party directly participated in the sale of the subject property 
with the purchaser. The non-privity parties made statements directly to the purchasers, 
thereby making reliance the primary issue in those cases." (See. Appellee's Brief, pg. 10-
4
 Appellee first conveyed his interest to Patterson Construction (recorded on October 11, 
1995 at 4:23pm), and then one minute later, Patterson conveyed its interest to GT Investments 
on October 11, 1995 at 4:24pm.. (R at 702, f 18.) Ten months later, GT Investments conveyed 
Lot 223 to Appellants on August 26,1996. (R at 701, \ 21.) 
10 
11). Appellee's sweeping conclusion evinces a misreading of the negligent 
misrepresentation cases cited by Appellants. 
For example, Appellee claims in Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title 
Insurance, 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983), that "the non-privity party was a real estate agent 
who told the injured party that the subject property was compromises [sic] of 22.75 acres 
when it only contained 6.9 acres." (See, Appellee's Brief, pg. 11).5 This is a 
misstatement of the factual background of Christenson. More accurately, this Court in 
Christenson explained: 
At the request of AGLA, Commonwealth sent AGLA a letter listing the lots which 
it represented had not been paid off. The list erroneously included five lots which 
had previously been paid off and assigned to the buyer. Thus, although the letter 
stated otherwise, AGLA had no beneficial interest left in those lots to assign. 
ACLA forwarded the letter to Merlyn Hanks, a trustee of Cape Trust. Using 
this information, Hanks drew up an assignment which included the five lots. 
Id. at 304 (emphasis added). Thus, the Christenson defendant sent AGLA a letter 
containing incorrect information and AGLA forwarded the letter to the Christenson 
plaintiff, who acted upon it. Thus, contrary to Appellee's claim, the non-privity party had 
no "direct communication"6 with the third-party plaintiff. 
5
 Appellee, of course, provides no pin-point cite to this erroneous statement. 
6
 Appellee claims that his "position has been because there was no direct 
communication relied upon by the Smiths made by Mary Mel,. .." (See, Appellee's Brief, pg. 
13) (emphasis added). 
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The same lack of "direct communication" occurred in Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. 
Rollins, Brown and GunnelL Inc.. 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986) which Appellee failed to 
address. In Price-Orem, this Court held: 
Clearly, Price-Orem has stated a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, 
[citation omitted]. Rollins, Brown, an engineering firm, was hired by JPA to 
survey and stake the property and the building site and was bound to do so with 
that degree of care and skill expected of licensed surveyors and/or engineers. 
Given the professional expertise of Rollins, Brown in the surveying field, both JPA 
and Price-Orem were entitled to reasonably rely upon the information provided by 
Rollins, Brown. And Price-Orem, as the owner of the property for whose 
benefit the shopping center was being constructed, was clearly a party whose 
justifiable reliance upon the accuracy of the survey might be reasonably 
foreseen. Other states considering this issue have held that a surveyor may be 
liable for damages incurred by a party who reasonably and foreseeably relies upon 
the surveyor's professional competence when the survey is negligently performed. 
Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added). Thus, the Price-Orem court used a reasonable 
foreseeability test to impute the architect's negligent misrepresentation to the non-privity 
third-party.7 
This Court, in Dugan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) impliedly referred to 
this foreseeability test by its adoption of Restatement (Second) Torts, § 552 which sets 
out the requirements for negligent misrepresentation: 
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any 
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest supplies false information 
7
 Although it appears that the architect met with the builder and the building owner at the 
building's location, this was after the survey problem had been detected. Id at 57 ("The error 
was discovered one month later when Rollins, Brown was performing additional survey work on 
the site. Rollins, Brown, JPA, and Price-Orem met at the job site to discuss the problem on 
July 17, 1974.") (emphasis added). Thus, just as in Christenson. there was no "direct 
communication" in Price-Orem either. 
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for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to 
liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the 
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining 
or communicating the information. 
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is 
limited to loss suffered. 
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose 
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or 
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and 
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the 
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a 
substantially similar transaction.'1 
Restatement (Second) Torts, § 552 (emphasis added) (cited by Dugan, supra, 615 P.2d at 
1249). The bolded language above is clearly not limited to the party in direct privity with 
the misrepresentor. Instead, the misrepresentor is liable for misrepresentations made for 
"the guidance of others" or to "one of a limited group of persons."8 
This is exactly the group of persons into which Appellants fit. Who does Appellee 
expect to benefit from Appellee's development of the land? According to the 
foreseeability test, Appellee clearly helped developed the land in question for the building 
of homes to be purchased by unsuspecting buyers such as Appellants. Developers do not 
develop land for themselves per se, nor for builders. They develop land mostly for third-
8
 This Court has recently reiterated this same language in Rawson v. Conoven 2001 UT 
24: "Negligent misrepresentation occurs when a person supplies false information for the 
guidance of others in their business transactions,..." Id. at \ 31 (emphasis added). 
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party purchasers (such as Appellants) who buy the building from the builder or hire a 
builder to build.9 
In sum, Appellants have established a prima facie showing of all the negligent 
misrepresentation elements. Thus, this cause of action should not have been disposed of 
below on summary judgment. 
B. Fraudulent Concealment 
Perhaps most telling of Appellee's discussion regarding Appellants' fraudulent 
concealment cause of action - and most persuasive - is Appellee's utter failure to address 
any of the caselaw and secondary sources cited in Appellants' appeal brief in support of 
this cause of action. Specifically, Appellee provides no opposition to Appellants' use of 
McDougal v. Weed. 945 P.2d 175 (Utah App. 1997), or to Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 
746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987). 
Furthermore, Appellee failed to address Appellants' citations from other 
9
 Appellee makes other less-inspiring claims such as it received no pecuniary interest 
from Appellants and thus this element of negligent misrepresentation is absent. However, based 
on the language of the cases cited in both appeal briefs, and the Restatement above, nowhere is 
Appellee's pecuniary interest limited by contractual privity. The pecuniary interest element of 
negligent misrepresentation is simply that Appellee receive pecuniary interest, which it 
undoubtedly did. 
Appellee also claims that it was in no superior position to know the facts because it 
simply did not do anything else other than road, sidewalk, curb and gutter work. However, 
Appellants have presented evidence in their earlier brief from experts and an independent 
neighborhood observer to the contrary which makes this argument an issue of fact and thus 
inappropriate for summary judgment. 
14 
jurisdictions such as Lawson v. Citizens and Southern National Bank of South Carolina, 
180S.E.2d206(S.C. 1971) and Tillis v. Smith Sons Lumber Co.. 188 Ala. 122(1914). 
Appellee even failed to address Appellants' secondary authority citations such as Emile F. 
Short, Annotation, Liability of Vendor or Grantor of Real Estate for Personal Injury to 
Purchaser or Third Person Due to Defective Condition of Premises, 58 A.L.R.3d 1027, 
§ 3 (2002) and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353. 
Instead of addressing Appellants' legal authority, Appellee attempts to dispose of 
Appellants' fraudulent concealment cause of action by arguing facts - an argument 
Appellants are happy to oblige because of the disputed issues of fact raised thereby. 
Specifically, Appellee makes the following factual arguments in opposition to 
Appellants' fraudulent concealment cause of action: 
>* Appellee did not communicate with Appellee. {See, Appellee's Brief, pg. 
14). Direct communication, however, is not an element to a claim for 
fraudulent concealment according to McDougal10 Lovdand,11 the A.L.R. 
10
 McDougal held that the duty to disclose "arise[s] from a relationship of trust 
between the parties, an inequality of knowledge or power between the parties, or other 
attendant circumstances indicating reliance." McDougal 945 P.2d at 179 (emphasis added). 
McDougal makes no mention of any "direct communication" requirement. 
11
 Loveland held that a land developer owes a duty to the downstream purchaser (even if 
no privity exists between the developer and the eventual purchaser) to disclose deficiencies that 
are not easily discernible during ordinary and reasonable investigation and to disclose conditions 
which the developer knows or should know and which makes subdivided lots unsuitable for 
residential building. Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769-70. 
15 
annotation by Emile F. Short,12 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353, 
Lawson and Tillis. 
^ Appellee was never a party to the transaction between Appellee and GT/Mr. 
Sharp. Id Contractual privity, however, is not an element of fraudulent 
concealment (see previous arrow). 
>^ Appellee disclosed everything to Patterson Construction. Id. What 
Appellee disclosed, along with what it knew, is a factual determination 
inappropriate for summary judgment. Appellants have provided expert and 
witness testimony that Appellee did not disclose everything it knew or 
should have known. (See. Brief of Appellants). 
>^ Appellee was not aware of any backfill compaction problems and (<had 
nothing to do with the fill." l± at 14-15. Again, what Appellee was aware 
of in regard to the uncompacted fill is an issue of fact inappropriate for 
summary judgment. 
>* Appellants have failed to prove intent and knowledge, but offer only 
speculation and innuendo regarding Appellee's knowledge. Id. at 14. 
Appellee can characterize Appellants' evidence how ever he likes, but 
evidence from Appellants' experts and fact witnesses (which Appellee 
characterizes as "speculation and innuendo") creates an issue of fact 
regarding Appellee's knowledge and intent, and is thus inappropriate for 
summary judgment. 
^ Appellee (<does not use wood and other construction material to install 
utilities and roads." Id at 15. Whatever Appellee uses to form its cement 
gutters, sidewalks, roads, etc., is an issue of fact, inappropriate for summary 
judgment. 
12
 Ms. Short explained in this annotation that the general rule in the context of personal 
injury, of course, is that a vendor of real estate is not liable for injuries caused to "a purchaser or 
third person caused by a defective condition of the premises existing at the time the purchaser 
takes possession." Emile F. Short, Annotation, Liability of Vendor or Grantor of Real Estate for 
Personal Injury to Purchaser or Third Person Due to Defective Condition of Premises, 58 
A.L.R.3d 1027, § 3 (2002) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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In sum, Appellee's claims that he does not use wood or other construction material, that 
he was not aware of any compaction problems with Lot 223, that he disclosed everything, 
and his characterizing of Appellants' expert and witness testimony as "speculation and 
innuendo" simply create issues of fact inappropriate for summary judgment. Appellee's 
other claims that he did not communicate directly with Appellants and that he was not a 
party to the transaction between Appellants and GT/Mr. Sharp are not elements of this 
cause of action according to McDougaL Loveland, Lawson, TilHs, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 353, and the A.L.R. annotation by Emile F. Short. The trial court's 
award of summary judgment should thus be overturned. 
C. Negligence 
Just as with Appellee's opposition to Appellants' fraudulent concealment cause of 
action, Appellee completely fails to address the cases cited in Appellants' appeal brief in 
support of their negligence cause of action (and, specifically, the duty element of said 
cause of action). For example, Appellee ignored Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 
(Wyo. 1984)13 and Loveland14 supra, which relied on Anderson. Appellee also failed to 
13
 The Anderson court held that where land is subdivided and sold for the purpose of 
constructing residential dwelling houses, the developer has a duty to exercises reasonable care 
to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of ordinary, average 
dwelling house Anderson. 681 P.2d at 1323 (quoted in Loveland. 746 P.2d at 769) 
14
 The Loveland court held that, "The duty defined by the Wyoming court [in Anderson] 
and our interpretation thereof is consistent with existing Utah law." Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769 
(emphasis added). 
17 
address U.C.A. § 57-11-17(1) and Stepanov v. Gavrilovich. 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979)15 
which were also cited in Appellants' appeal brief. 
Inexplicably, in lieu of addressing Appellants' legal argument, Appellee attacks 
Appellants' claims on the facts! Appellee's first factual argument is that Appellants 
cannot establish the duty element of negligence because Appellee "had no responsibility 
concerning the grading or earthwork on" Appellants' property itself. Id at 16. Appellee 
then weighs the evidence Appellants' produced in their appeal brief in support of the 
inference that Appellee was responsible for the uncompacted fill, and concludes this 
weighing of Appellants evidence by proclaiming that Appellants' evidence and this 
inference are "nothing but speculation." (See. Brief of Appellee, pg. 17). 
Appellee's rhetoric simply belies his attitude that, without a smoking gun, lam not 
liable}** To Appellee, the data, analyses and reports from Appellants' two experts is 
"nothing but speculation." To Appellee, the eye-witness account of a neighbor (Micah 
15
 Stepanov was relied upon by the Anderson court and cited approvingly in Loveland. 
746 P.2d at 770. 
16
 On the contrary, we agree with William Shakespeare: 
Who finds the heifer dead and bleeding fresh, 
And sees fast by a butcher with an axe, 
But will suspect 
twas he that made the slaughter? 
William Shakespeare, King Henry the Sixth, part 2, act 3, sc. 2, lin. 254 (Compact ed. Oxford 
University Press 1988). 
18 
Merrill) is also "nothing but speculation." To Appellee, aerial photographs taken before 
and after Appellee and Patterson Construction's development is "nothing but 
speculation." Appellee can characterize Appellants' evidence however he wishes and 
Appellee can claim all he wants that he did not contribute to any of the fill on Lot 223 
because such dickering with the evidence is a task best suited for a jury, not a judge on 
summary judgment. 
III. APPELLEE'S ECONOMIC LOSS RULE CLAIM SHOULD BE IGNORED 
BECAUSE APPELLEE FAILED TO RAISE THIS CLAIM BELOW 
Appellee concludes his appeal brief (and tries to pull a fast one on the Court) by 
urging the Court to dismiss Appellants' appeal based on the economic loss rule "even if 
[the economic loss rule] was not raised at the district court." (See, Appellee's Brief, pg. 
18). This proposition, however, flies in the face of decades of caselaw established by this 
Court. Consider the following cases directly contrary to Appellee's contention that this 
Court can adjudicate an appeal on an entirely new ground not before the Court: 
>~ appellate courts "do not consider issues that were not presented to the trial 
court." Zions First Natl Bank. N.A. v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 
654 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added). 
>* "matters neither raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal." Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 
754, 758 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). 
>* "Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final settlement of controversies, 
requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory or theories of 
recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he cannot thereafter change to 
19 
some different theory and thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-round 
of litigation." Simpson v. General Motors Corp.. 470 P.2d 399,401 (1970) 
(Emphasis added). 
>^ arguments "not presented to the trial court for decision are not reviewable by this 
Court, . . ." Travnerv. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). 
Thus, based on well-established Utah precedent, this Court should ignore Appellee's 
economic loss rule claim.17 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should reverse the trial court's award of 
summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
fo DATED this * ^ day of September, 2002. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
17
 Should the Court hold otherwise, Appellants' fraudulent concealment cause of action 
against Appellee nonetheless survives the economic loss rule because it is a non-intentional tort: 
"The 'economic loss rule' is the majority position that one may not recover 'economic' losses 
under a theory of non-intentional tort." Maack v. Resource Design & Constr.. 875 P.2d 570, 
579-80 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis added). Further, under these facts, the economic loss rule 
does not apply to Appellants' developer liability claims because there is no direct communication 
or contractual privity by which Appellants would be able to assert a cause of action that would 
survive the economic loss rule. 
20 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the )* day of September 2002, they 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing reply brief to be delivered to the 
following: 
Michael W. Homer 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
Bret S. Hayman 
Thomas B. Price 
Suitter Axland 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1480 
SentVi* 
y Hand -Delivery 
Facsimile 
Mailed (postage prepaid) 
21 
i:\HIBIT "A" 
Michael W. Homer (#1535) 
Jesse C. Trentadue (#4961) 
Thomas B. Price (#8254) 
SUITTER AXLAND 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Defendants Mel Frandsen 
dba Mary Mel Construction Co. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH ( 01 M Y 
STATE OF UTAH 




PATTERSON CONSTRUCTION, INC., a 
Utah corporation; JOSEPH SHARP, an 
individual; GT INVESTMENTS, MEL 
FRANDSEN dba MARY MEL 
CONSTRUCTION CO., 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT MEL FRANDSEN dba 
MARY MEL CONSTRUCTION, CO.'S 
COMBINED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
Case No. 000402150 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Defendant Mel Frandsen dba Mary Mel Construction Co., (collectively referred to 
as "Mary Mel") hereby requests this Court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, with its causes of action against 
Mary Mel, with prejudice, and to award Marv MV»I ito ott^ r^. • u ~ : _ f J 
This Motion for Summary Judgment is directed at Plaintiffs' inclusion of Mary 
Mel as a defendants in this matter. At no time during the contracting, construction and sale of 
the Plaintiffs' house, did Mary Mel have privity, a duty to or any nexus with Plaintiffs. Mary 
Mel has never communicated with Plaintiffs prior to this suit. Plaintiffs failed and refused to 
conduct a cursory investigation that would indicate Mary Mel had privity, a duty to, or any nexis 
with Plaintiffs and their house. The disturbing alternative to Plaintiffs failure to investigate is 
that they simply ignored what they knew and included Mary Mel as a defendant. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mary Mel 
requests oral argument on its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 (2)(A) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Mary 
Mel hereby submits this Memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment 
Introduction 
This is a construction defect case wherein Plaintiffs, a couple, are alleging defects 
to their recently constructed house and are seeking damages against the parties believed to be 
involved in the development, contracting, construction and sale of their house. 
Mary Mel, acting as a developer, purchased raw land, obtained approval from the 
Lehi City Planning Commission and the Lehi City Counsel, constructed the roads, utilities, curb 
and gutter,1 then sold the entire development, Summer Crest Subdivision, to Patterson 
lfThe water/sewage system was installed beneath the road and abutted the property lines of the individual 
lots Mary Mel did not develop, grade, or install water/sewage lines, on the individual lots. 
Construction, Inc. Patterson Construction developed most of the lots in Summer Crest and sold a 
few to other developers. Patterson Construction sold lot 223 (the "Property") to GT Investments 
which built a house on the Property and sold the Property to Plaintiffs. 
The issue before the Court on this Motion for Summary Judgment is simple. 
Plaintiffs fail to prove an essential element in each of its four causes of action pled against Mary 
Mel. Plaintiffs included Mary Mel, despite the absence of contractual privity, a duty to, or nexus 
with the Plaintiffs or development, construction or sale of the Property. Mary Mel should be 
dismissed, with prejudice, from this matter due to the lack of privity, duty and nexus and be 
awarded their attorneys fees and costs incurred in its defense of the baseless allegations. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Mary Mel installed the roads, utilities, curb, sidewalk, and gutters in the Summer 
Crest Subdivision. See Mel Frandsen's Deposition Testimony, Pages 8, 33-34. A true and 
correct copy is attached as Exhibit "A," which is fully incorporated herein, 
2. Mary Mel delivered a warranty deed to the Property to Patterson Construction on 
October 10, 1995. A true and correct copy is attached as Exhibit "B," which is fully incorporated 
herein. 
3. Patterson Construction delivered a warranty deed to the Property to GT 
Investments on October 10,1995. A true and correct copy is attached as Exhibit "B," which is 
fully incorporated herein. 
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4. GT Investments delivered a warranty deed to the Property to Plaintiffs on August 
26,1996. A true and correct copy is attached as Exhibit "B," which is fully incorporated herein. 
5. GT Investments built the house on the Property and sold it to the Plaintiffs See 
Second Amended Complaint, Paragraph 12. Plaintiffs were and are the first occupants of the 
house Id. 
ARGUMENT 
Amoving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as matter of law. Utah R. Civ Proc, Rule 56(c). The standard for granting summary judgment is 
well established, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law/' Tretheway v. Miracle 
Mortgage, Inc., 995 P.2d 599 (Utah 2000). Moreover, "a trial court may properly grant a motion 
for summary judgment or directed verdict only when reasonable minds could not differ on the 
facts to be determined from the evidence presented. Under Utah law, Plaintiffs have the burden 
to present evidence establishing each element of their case and their failure to do so "justifies a 
grant of summary judgment to Defendant:7 Dikeou v. Osborne, 881 P.2d 943, 946 (Utah Ct.App. 
1994) see also: Burns v. Cannondale, 876 P.2d 415, (Utah Ct.App. 1994). 
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Mary Mel's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as a matter of law 
based upon Plaintiffs lack of privity, duty to, and nexus with Mary Mel regarding the Property's 
soil, its compaction and the construction of Plaintiffs' house on the Property. Accordingly, Mary 
Mel is entitled to summary judgment dismissing it from this matter, with prejudice, and an award 
for attorneys' fees and costs. 
1. Mary Mel Should be Dismissed From This Matter As Plaintiffs 
Fail To Prove an Essential Element in Each of Their Causes of 
Action Against Mary Meh as It Had No Privity, No Duty and 
No Nexus to Plaintiffs and The Property 
The Plaintiffs' allegations against Mary Mel are limited to the following causes of action: 
a.) Negligent Misrepresentation; b.) Fraudulent Concealment; c.) Negligence; and d.) Joint 
Venture. 
a. Negligent Misrepresentation 
Plaintiffs' Tenth Cause of Action: Negligent Misrepresentation should be 
dismissed, with prejudice, as pled against Mary Mel, because Plaintiffs fail to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to their case. Specifically, Plaintiffs 
lacked contractual privity with Mary Mel 
The Utah Supreme Court has described the tort of negligent misrepresentation as 
follows: 
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Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction, (2) is in a 
superior position to know material facts, and (3) carelessly or negligently makes a 
false representation concerning them, (4) expecting the other party to rely and act 
thereon, and (5) the other party reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in that 
transaction, the representor can be held responsible if the other elements of fraud 
are also present. 
DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1008 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (citing Jardine v. 
Brunswick, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1967)). 
Plaintiffs cannot support their claim of Negligent Misrepresentation. An analysis 
of the undisputed facts of the case against the stated elements demonstrates that this claim must 
be dismissed with prejudice from this matter. Mary Mel did not have a pecuniary interest in the 
Property being sold to Plaintiffs. It is undisputed that prior to Plaintiffs' bargaining to purchase 
the Property from GT Investments, Mary Mel installed the roads, utilities, curb and gutter, and 
sold any and all interest it had in the Summer Crest Subdivision to Patterson Construction. Later, 
Patterson Construction sold the Property to GT Investments. It was GT Investments that 
developed the Property and built the house that allegedly is defective. 
Due to the timing of Mary Mel's sale of the Property to Patterson, it is axiomatic 
that Mary Mel had no pecuniary interest in Plaintiffs' transaction for the Property. Moreover, 
Mary Mel was not in a superior position to know any facts regarding the construction of the 
house. Any and all facts which did exist or which were in existence at the time the Property was 
sold to the Smiths and were known by Mary Mel were disclosed by Mary Mel to Patterson 
Construction prior to the sale of the Property to Patterson Construction. Mary Mel had never 
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communicated with Plaintiffs and was, therefore, impossible for Mary Mel to carelessly or 
negligently make a false representation to Plaintiffs about anything regarding the Property. All 
Mary Mel's knowledge regarding this matter is related to the road, sidewalk, curb and gutter in 
the subdivision. 
b. Fraudulent Concealment. 
Plaintiffs' Eleventh Cause of Action: Fraudulent Concealment should be 
dismissedas pled against Mary Mel, because Plaintiffs fail to make a showing sufficient to establish 
the existence of an element essential to their case. Specifically, Plaintiffs lacked contractual 
privity with Mary MeL 
The Utah Supreme Court has described the Plaintiffs' Eleventh Cause of Action: 
Fraudulent Concealment as follows: 
One party to a transaction who by concealment or other action intentionally 
prevents the other from acquiring material information is subject to the same 
liability to the other for pecuniary loss as though he had stated the nonexistence of 
the matter that the other was thus prevented from discovering. 
Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (1994) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §550, at 118 (1977)). 
It is undisputed that Mary Mel did not, at any time, communicate with or have 
contractual privity with Plaintiffs. Mary Mel was never a "party to the transaction" of the 
Property between GT Investments and Plaintiffs for the Property. Importantly, even if Mary Mel 
is determined to have been a remote party to the transaction, any and all work performed by Mary 
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Mel and material information related thereto, which included the installation of the road, utilities 
under the road, curb, gutter and sidewalk up to each individual lot was disclosed by Mary Mel to 
Patterson Construction. Additionally, the backfill compaction complained of by the Smiths is not 
a material fact which was known by Mary Mel. 
c. Negligence. 
Plaintiffs Twelfth Cause of Action: Negligence should be dismissed, with 
prejudice, as pled against Mary Mel. Plaintiffs fail to establish the existence of elements essential 
to this cause of action. Specifically, Mary Mel did not owe Plaintiffs a duty of care. 
The elements of negligence are well-known. The Utah Supreme Court determined 
"[t]o prove negligence, a plaintiff must show four things: duty, breach of duty, causation, and 
damages;7 Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, (Utah 1999). 
Plaintiffs' erroneously plead that Mary Mel was responsible for grading and 
earthwork on the Property. Mary Mel installed the road, utilities, sidewalks, curb and gutter in 
the Summer Crest Subdivision. Mary Mel's duty to the Plaintiffs was one of ensuring the road, 
curb, gutter and utilities were properly installed up to the Property and met Utah County and Lehi 
City ordinance requirements. Smith's allegations are simply outside of the scope of work 
performed by Mary Mel. Mary Mel did not work on the Property and owed no duty to the 
Smiths regarding the soil, its compaction, or the development of the Property. 
Since there is no duty owed to Plaintiffs, obviously, there can be no breach. 
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Assuming arguendo that this Court determined that Mary Mel owed Plaintiffs a 
duty, Plaintiffs cannot show that the road, utilities, curb, gutter, sidewalks caused a crack in the 
foundation of the Property. 
It is axiomatic that Mary Mel did not owe Plaintiffs a duty regarding the soil, its 
compaction on the Property, or the construction of their house. Mary Mel's involvement and 
performance in the Summer Crest Subdivision is out of the scope of Plaintiffs' claim for 
negligence. 
d. Joint Venture Liability 
Plaintiffs' Thirteenth Cause of Action: Joint Venture Liability should be dismissed 
as pled against Mary Mel because Plaintiffs fail to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to their case. Specifically, Mary Mel had no joint venture 
agreement or understanding with Patterson Construction. 
The Utah Supreme Court has described the Plaintiffs' Thirteenth Cause of Action: 
Joint Venture as follows: 
The requirements for the relationship are not exactly defined, but certain 
elements are essential: The parties must combine their property, money, effects, 
skill, labor and knowledge. As a general rule, there must be a community of 
interest in the performance of the common purpose, a joint proprietary interest in 
the subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share in the profits, and 
unless there is an agreement to the contrary, a duty to share in any losses which 
may be sustained. While the agreement to share losses need not necessarily be 
stated in specific terms, the agreement must be such as to permit the court to infer 
that the parties intend to share losses as well as profits. 
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Basset v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974). The undisputed facts in this matter demonstrate that 
Mary Mel's relationship was not a joint venture according to Utah law. First, the knowledgeable 
parties testified that Mary Mel did not have a joint venture with Patterson Construction.2 Second, 
Mary Mel had no right to control what Patterson Construction did or to whom it sold the lots. Id. 
Third, Mary Mel got paid its agreed upon compensation regardless of what or how many lots 
Patterson Construction sold. Id. Mary Mel did not share in the profits and/or losses sustained by 
Patterson Construction in the Summer Crest Subdivision. Id. Nor was Mary Mel's payment 
based upon the sale or amount of sale Patterson Construction sold the lots. Id. 
Reasonable minds cannot differ that Plaintiffs cannot present evidence which 
would establish each element in their causes of actions against Mary Mel. Plaintiffs' failure to 
the establish the elements warrants a grant of Mary Mel's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. Mary Mel Should Receive Its Attorneys' Fees and Costs for 
Defending Itself Against Claims Made in Bad Faith 
It is well established in Utah that attorneys' fees and costs cannot be recovered 
unless provided for by contract, rule or statute. Plaintiffs knew they were NOT dealing with 
Mary Mel concerning the development, construction and purchase of their house in Lehi, Utah. 
See Arguments supra. At no time did Mary Mel either communicate, plan, bargain, or sell with 
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' actions demonstrate a lack of integrity and abuse of the legal system and 
warrants judicial action in the form of sanctions. 
2See Mel Frandsen's Deposition, Pages 7,15, and 24; James Patterson's Deposition, Pages 10,11. 63 and 
64. A true and correct copy of the above-cited pages are attached hereto as Exhbit UC," and fully incorporated 
herein. 
Statutory Sanctions 
Utah statute allows this court, in its discretion, to award attorneys fees in this case 
as a means of sanctioning the Plaintiffs' harmful and irresponsible actions. Utah Code Ann. §78-
27-56 reads, 
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection 
(2). 
U.C.A. § 78-27-56 (as amended). Plaintiffs meet both statutory requirements permitting the 
award of attorneys' fees for Mary Mel's counsel. As they relate to Mary Mel, Plaintiffs claims 
are without merit and asserted in bad faith. Plaintiffs' claims against Mary Mel are neither based 
in law nor supported by evidence and warrant sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees and costs. 
Utah R. Civ. Pro., Rule 11 Sanctions 
Plaintiffs acted in bad faith by naming and serving Mary Mel in the Second 
Amended Complaint. To find a party acted in bad faith, the court must find that one or more of 
the following factors existed: (i) the party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities 
in question; (ii) the party intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party 
intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or 
defraud others. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998). Despite Plaintiffs' 
knowledge that Mary Mel lacked privity, nexus or a duty to Plaintiffs, they served Mary Mel 
anyway. Plaintiffs cannot feign that they 'lacked an honest belief that Mary Mel should not 
have been included as a defendant in this matter. 
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The facts to the matter were easily obtainable and were ascertained with minimal 
inquiry. It is clear Plaintiffs investigated the facts of this matter. Despite not having ever 
communicated with Mary Mel, Plaintiffs discovered Mary Mel contributed to Summer Crest 
Subdivision. Plaintiffs failed met their statutory duty to involve only the necessary parties to the 
law suit. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other 
paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an 
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for farther investigation or discovery. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 (b). Unfortunately, despite the facts discovered, 
Plaintiffs improperly named Mary Mel as Defendant to this action. In their Second Amended 
Complaint, Plaintiffs incorrectly asserted that Mary Mel filled a ravine with fill dirt and 
concealed such actions, which proximately caused Plaintiffs' damages. See Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint It is clear that the Plaintiffs either failed and refused to follow facts and 
documentation in their possession and determine including Mary Mel as a defendant was 
inappropriate. Apparently, Plaintiffs simply chose to ignore the evidence, law and obligation of 
good faith. 
While Plaintiffs' counsel may assert that they were only zealously pursuing all 
possible defendants in its duty to the Plaintiffs, it is clear that counsel may have crossed the line 
in this instance, "[t]his rule [Rule 1 1 ] . . . emphasizes an attorney's public duty as an officer of 
the court, as opposed to the attorney's private duty to represent a client's interest zealously." 
Clark v. Booth, 821 P.2d 1146, 1149 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs' and their counsel's refusal and failure to follow Rule 11 warrant sanctions 
from this court. Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed against Plaintiffs because counsel filed 
their Amended Complaint which lacked merit and was filed in bad faith because counsel failed to 
conduct reasonable inquiry. "Sanctions are imposed under rule 11 as a disciplinary or punitive 
measure for unacceptable conduct and may be assessed at any time during the course of a judicial 
proceeding." Clark v. Booth, 821 P.2d 1146, 1147 (Utah 1991). 
In summary, this Court should order that Defendant Mary Mel should be 
dismissed, with prejudice, from the following causes of action: Negligent Misrepresentation, 
Fraudulent Concealment, Negligence, Joint Venture, and Punitive Damages and award Mary 
Mel its attorneys' fees and costs in its defense. The granting of Mary Mel's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is based upon Plaintiffs' failure to meet their the burden to present evidence 
establishing each element of their causes of action and Mary Mel's lack of privity, duty or nexus 
with Plaintiffs. 
Request for Oral Argument 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, oral 
argument is requested. 
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DATED this [A- day of September, 2001. 
SUITTER AXLAND 
By: W/tfl^A: 
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Jesse C. Trentadue 
Thomas B. Price 
Attorneys for Defendants Mel Frandsen 
dba Mary Mel Construction 
Excavation, Inc. 
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1 Q, So you would do — 
2 A. And it was for a fee. 
3 Q. Yeah. So you would do the utilities the big 
4 utilities, the sewers, groundwater, roads. 
5 A. Roads -
6 Q. Curbs and gutters? 
7 A- Curbs and gutters and sidewalk. 
8 Q. And then — 
9 A- Everything in the road. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. To the front edge of the property. 
12 Q, And in fact, did -- was it you or Mary Mel 
13 Construction who did the actual work on the roads? 
14 A. It was Mary Mel Construction. 
15 Q. Okay. Now when Mary Mel -- well, let me try 
16 to understand. WhatTs your understanding -- what's 
17 your role with Mary Mel Construction? Do you go out 
18 J there and supervise every little thing they do or are 
19 you jusr kind of behind the scenes? What's your role 
20 with Mary Mel Construction as far as doing these roads? 
21 A. Probably -- I take care of the finances and 
22 arrangements and getting the engineering done, getting 
23 it through city approvals. And my son, Dan, is preuty 
24 much the superintendent of construction. 
25 Q. So like would you just tell him hey, here's 
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1 construction. Of course you have to get it bonded and 
2 recorded and all that sort of stuff, but as far as 
3 approval, that's the point where the city approves 'it. 
4 Q. Okay. 
5 A. City counsel, final approval. 
6 Q. Okay. And then once you have the city's 
7 approval, is that when you go in and start putting the 
8 road in and the utilities in, going through that 
9 process? 
10 A. Yeah. 
11 Q. Do you have anything to do with leveling of 
12 the lots or anything like that? 
13 A. Nothing. 
14 Q. If the -- say if it's like a hilly area --
15 I A. Uh-huh. 
16 Q. -- that the lots are going through. Do you 
17 have any involvement with Frandsen coming in and 
18 J levelling the lots out? Is there some sort of process 
19 where they're at least made to look like they're 
20 buildable or are they just sold as is, regardless of 
21 the condition of the lot? 
22 A. Well, when you say they're sold as is, I 
23 don't know what the person that sells them does 
24 because, you know, the limit of my involvement is the 
road. I get the roads ready and the utilities to the 25 
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1 edge of the front line of the property — curb, gutter, 
2 sidewalk and asphalt and I don't do anything to the 
3 lots. 
4 Q. Okay. Now when you put the road in and 
5 utilities, do you still own all of this property at 
6 that point or is there some sort of co-ownership with 
7 Patterson? 
8 A . I think in this case it was probably 
9 about -- at that point it was probably a co-ownership 
10 with the understanding that Patterson was going to 
11 buy -- take over. 
12 Q. All of the lots — 
13 A. The project --
14 Q. -- once you completed the road. 
15 A. -- the project, yeah. 
16 Q. And was there a certain point upon 
17 completion that you then sold the property over to 
18 Patterson? 
19 A. Well, it was probably -- I would think 
20 before they either built or resold. So it was in thei 
21 name, you know. 
22 Q. To your knowledge --
23 A. We've done it so many different ways, you 
2 4 know. 
25 Q. Sure and I understand this was a long time 
3 4 
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ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON FILE IN THE OFFICE OF 
THE UTAH COUNTY RECORDER* 
TaxLD. No.: 52:554:223 
Subject to easements, restrictions, and rights of way appearing of record. 
WITNESS, the hand of said Grantor, this 26TH day of AUGUST, A.D. 1996. 
Signed in the Presence of: 
6.TANVES' TMENTS 
BY: 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
On the 26TH day of AUGUST, 1996, personally appeared before me UQ£ L* S/VJJjO > who being by me 
duly sworn did say, that he, the said <Jflf £ . ^falT/P is theVICE PRESIDENT, of 
G.T. INVESTMENST, and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of a resolution of its board of directors and said <jfe £ d . ?Jt£Lfy& duly acknowledged to me 
that said corporation executed the same. 
My commission expires: 4-6-00 
Residing at: UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
**) Notary Public 
' ^ % \ KRISTIN ANDERSON 
fcV
^»>\ tomwBix .smiuuH 
li&fc }JJ *49 EAST 1300 SOUTH 
tf OR6H, UTAH S4QSS 
1
 COMM. EXP. 4-640 ^ 
1 t h a t weTre t a l k i n g about from Timpanogos Air I n c . ? 
2 A. Well, I f d been doing work with Pa t t e r son 
3 p rev ious to t h a t doing improvements and subd iv i s ions 
4 for them and we were j u s t moving on and ge t t ing some 
5 more. And my arrangement i s to — has been and was on 
6 t h a t one to obta in the proper ty and get i t approved 
7 through the c i t y for a subdiv is ion p l a t and then I 
8 would put the u t i l i t i e s and the road system i n . They 
9 end up buying the proper ty from me. The agreement was 
10 then t h a t I would put the improvements in to the f r o n t 
11 of the l o t s and t h a t ' s been my involvement with 
12 P a t t e r s o n s . 
13 Q. So from the very beginning, you were kind of 
14 working with them to develop --
15 A. I bought that property in conjunction with 
16 them. I put the money up, but they were behind the 
17 thing/ you know, as "far as, yeah, we want 
18 this property. Yeah, we're going to develop and build 
19 this. 
20 Q. You made other plans with them together. 
21 You wouldn't have just done this on your own? 
22 A. No, no. It was with the understanding that 
23 they would end up buying the property after I had 
24 gotten it to a certain point of approvals and that I 
25 would do the improvements on the subdivision for them. 
7 
1 else about it. 
2 Q. So you don't know whether, for example, 
3 Patterson would have been the one who dealt with that. 
4 A. Heavens, no. How would I know? I could 
5 speculate, but I'm not going to. 
6
 Q. I don't want you to speculate. So in 
7 summary, you're saying you don't know whether there was 
8 a ravine or if someone filled it — you don't even know 
9 whether it was filled. 
1 0
 A. I couldn't tell you where the ravines were, 
11 you know. I just couldn't go back and reconstruct this 
12 is where the ravines were, where the hills were. 
1 3
 Q. And you don't recall filling in any ravines 
14 to create lots. 
1 5
 I A. No. The only thing I did was put the road 
16 in and that is the extent of my agreement with 
17 Patterson. Just the road and the utilities within the 
18 road. 
1 9
 Q- And you have no idea who would have filled 
20 in lot 222. 
21 A. How many times are you going to ask me that 
22 same question? 
2 3
 Q. I just want to make sure I'm getting a clear 
2 4 answer. 
2 5
 A. I do not know who filled the ravines in. 
15 
MR. HOMER: Okay. Should we just take Dan? 
MR. QUESENBERRY: Well, maybe they have 
questions. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HANSEN: 
Q. Well, Mr. Frandsen, you wouldn't consider 
yourself in a joint venture relationship with 
Patterson, would you at all? 
A* No. Not really, no. 
Q. And why would you say that? 
A. Well, the work I do was a fee basis, a 
predetermined fee basis and whether they sold them or 
didn't sell them or build them or whatever was pretty 
much immaterial. They just paid me a flat fee that we 
worked out on each lot. 
Q. Okay. You weren't sharing profits, anything 
of that nature? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I wish we were. 
Q. You were asked about how deep this cut in 
the road was and you didn't characterize it as very 
deep. I suppose -- is that --
A. Well --




























Q. Does he still work for you? 
A- He doesn't work for us. But he's a realtor, 
yeah, he still sells stuff for us all the time. And we 
list properties with him occasionally. We continue to do 
business with him. He's a broker at Westfield Real Estate, 
he's the head broker there. 
Q. What I want to talk about now is I want to go 
back to the Summer Crest subdivision general, back when it 
started back in the early '90s, I guess. From the 
documents I've seen, it seems it started in the early f90s( 
Tell me how you, Patterson, became involved with this 
subdivision. 
A. Well, Blaine alluded to it. Mary Mel 
Construction, he said Mel. 
Q. Mel Frandsen? 
A. Yeah, Mel Frandsen. The name of his company is 
Mary Mel Construction, he's the one that did the 
development, we bought the lots from, and we come and 
purchased all — we bought the property or the lots from 
them, and some of the property we'd bought. But he did 
the — he got it through the city, he did all the 
improvements, he made all the cuts, he did all the curb, 
gutters, sidewalks, sewers, all that kind of stuff. So 
Patterson didn't do any of it. 
Q. When did you first get involved in this 
























A. From the very offset. We were the ones that 
would buy all the lots from him and own all the lots. 
Q. Let me just tell you this, the earliest documents 
I could find talk about 1991; does that sound right? 
A. That sounds about right, early '90s. 
Q. We'll go through these all. What I did is, I 
want you to know, I went through the documents that you 
produced and I've just picked out a number of things. And 
they're not going to be in a real good order. 
A. That's fine. 
Q. So tell me, what was the first contact that you 
can remember with this subdivision? Did Mel approach you, 
did you approach him, what happened? 
A. I can't even remember. It's been so long, I 
wouldn't even know who approached who. 
Q. What: was the basic deal that you had with Mel? 
A. He improved the property, and then we bought the 
lots from him, that was basically all. 
Q. Cash transaction, you paid him X amount of --
A. Yeah. We just paid him so much per lot for this 
development. 
Q. Did you pay,him as you sold them, or did you just 
buy them outright? 
A. It varied. Sometimes we'd pay him each month, 



























Q. But just so I can finish my question, it did 
include some people that were doing excavation on 
individual lots in the first half of 1993? 
A. Yeah. Only on the ones we built though, right. 
Q. Now, as I understood your testimony, you said, 
and I may have written this down slightly wrong, but you 
said Mary Mel Construction did the development for us, he 
did development^for us. What do you mean by did 
development, what's that? 
A. He's the one that gets, you know, takes the 
property, goes to the city, gets it approved, you know, for 
a subdivision. Gets it through the planning commission, 
gets it through the city council. He's the one that 
aligns, you know, determines with the city where the 
streets will be. He runs the water, and sewer, and curb 
and gutter, and does the cuts, you know, for the roads. He 
runs the laterals, sidewalks, all that, that's the 
development. When we buy the lots from him, they're 
improved. 
Q. Okay. He went to the permitting process with the 
city? 
A. We do the building permits on the home. 
Q. Yes, individual lot building permits? 
A. Right. 



























And he would have submitted any engineering drawings to the 
city, indicating what grading was going to be done, whether 
there was going to be any mass grading? 
A. Right. 
Q. Whether any topography was going to be changed, 
whether any drainage was going to be altered, he would have 
told the city all of that? 
A. Well, the city would have told him. 
Q. Once he gave them the plans? 
A. Well, it is the city that determines that, not 
us. 
Q. When you say us — 
A. Or him, I mean. 
Q. I want to understand this relationship with Mel 
Frandsen in early 1993, were you partners with him? 
A. No, we'd just buy the property from him, or the 
lots. 
Q. When did your relationship with Mel Frandsen 
first start? 
A. On our Hill Top subdivision, I don't know if it 
was in the '80s or early '90s, and it was the same thing, 
he'd develop lots and we'd buy the lots from him. 
Q. So how did you come to this arrangement with him 
that he would develop and you buy the lots, when did you 
first come to that kind of arrangement? 
